Worker Effort Decisions and Efficient Gender-Specific Wage-Tenure Profiles
Despite theoretical arguments that predict the opposite, empirical estimates of workers' returns to tenure tend to be greater for female than for male workers. This paper develops an agency model of wage contracts to explain this empirical finding. If male and female workers differ only in the expected length of their working lives, efficient wage-tenure profiles are steeper for women than men as a direct result of their shorter working life. This result implies that returns to tenure for women and men will become comparable as women's and men's labor force attachments converge. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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