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Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew P. Dickerson
  • Heather D. Gibson
  • Euclid Tsakalotos

Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies can use acquisition as a strategy to reduce their likelihood of take-over. The determinants of making an acquisition and being taken over are modelled for the first time within a competing risks framework using two large samples of UK manufacturing companies which together cover most of the post-World War II period up to 1990. Our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, companies which make acquisitions can significantly reduce their conditional probability of being taken over by around one-third, largely through the impact that acquisition has on corporate size. In this sense, attack, through acquisition, is the best form of defence against take-over. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew P. Dickerson & Heather D. Gibson & Euclid Tsakalotos, 2003. "Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 27(3), pages 337-357, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:27:y:2003:i:3:p:337-357
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    Cited by:

    1. Sanjiv Jaggia & Satish Thosar, 2019. "An evaluation of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in a competing risks framework," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 43(3), pages 569-581, July.
    2. Silviano Esteve-Pérez & Amparo Sanchis-Llopis & Juan Sanchis-Llopis, 2010. "A competing risks analysis of firms’ exit," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 281-304, April.
    3. Andy Cosh & Alan Hughes, 2008. "Takeovers after "Takeovers"," Working Papers wp363, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Dimara, Efthalia & Skuras, Dimitris & Tsekouras, Kostas & Tzelepis, Dimitris, 2008. "Productive efficiency and firm exit in the food sector," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 185-196, April.
    5. Eleni Angelopoulou & Heather D. Gibson, 2009. "The Balance Sheet Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence from the United Kingdom," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(304), pages 675-703, October.
    6. Eleni Angelopoulou & Heather D. Gibson, 2007. "The Balance Sheet Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission: Evidence from the UK," Working Papers 53, Bank of Greece.
    7. Dimara, Efthalia & Tzelepis, Dimitris & Skuras, Dimitris, 2000. "Regional Development Incentives And Firm Survival: A Case Study Of The Greek Food Sector," ERSA conference papers ersa00p209, European Regional Science Association.
    8. repec:ntu:ntugeo:vol1-iss2s-13-131 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Alessandra Amendola & Marialuisa Restaino & Luca Sensini, 2013. "Corporate Financial Distress And Bankruptcy: A Comparative Analysis In France, Italy And Spain," Global Economic Observer, "Nicolae Titulescu" University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Sciences;Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy, vol. 1(2), pages 131-142, November.
    10. Taylan Mavruk & Evert Carlsson, 2015. "How long is a long-term-firm investment in the presence of governance mechanisms?," Eurasian Business Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(1), pages 117-149, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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