Three problems of social organisation: institutional law and economics meets Habermasian law and democracy
This paper attempts to identify certain implications of Habermasian ethics for the economic analysis of law. It does so by demonstrating a complementarity between the Habermas of Between Facts and Norms and the Veblen--Ayres--Commons tradition(s) of economic analysis. Three unresolved problems of social organisation raised by the institutionalists are addressed: the legitimacy of the status quo ante (Buchanan-Schmid), the legitimacy of society's transaction structure (Klevorick) and the problem of social order (Hobbes-Platteau). Discourse ethics demonstrates how these problems may be resolved. The model of human agency adopted in institutional law and economics permits an easier fit with discourse ethics than would be possible with the neoclassical traditions. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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