IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/cambje/v15y1991i4p425-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corporatism, Profit Squeeze and Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Henley, Andrew
  • Tsakalotos, Euclid

Abstract

This paper argues that the mainstream literature on corporatism focuses too narrowly on the relationship between corporatism and the labor market. It adopts a broader political economy perspective to argue that corporatist arrangements impart macroeconomic stability through the resolution of distributional conflict and through greater investment stability. Results for nineteen OECD economies are presented that demonstrate that economies with strong corporatist institutions have enjoyed much greater success in forestalling the profit squeeze of the 1970s and early 1980s. Further results also demonstrate that investment in such economies is more stable and resilient to movements in profitability. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Henley, Andrew & Tsakalotos, Euclid, 1991. "Corporatism, Profit Squeeze and Investment," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 425-450, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:15:y:1991:i:4:p:425-50
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Henley & Euclid Tsakalotos, 1992. "Corporatism and the European Labour Market after 1992," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(4), pages 567-586, December.
    2. Seguino, Stephanie, 1999. "The Investment Function Revisited: Disciplining Capital in Korea," MPRA Paper 6539, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:15:y:1991:i:4:p:425-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/cje .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.