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The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers--An Incomplete Contracts Approach

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  • Kira Fuchs
  • Florian Herold

Abstract

The separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: the executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision maker. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

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  • Kira Fuchs & Florian Herold, 2011. "The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers--An Incomplete Contracts Approach," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 131-167.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:13:y:2011:i:1:p:131-167
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahq016
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Andrew D. & Hazelton Morgan L.W., 2012. "What Political Science Can Contribute to the Study of Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 511-529, October.
    2. Shelton, Cameron A., 2023. "Where does opportunity knock? On doors that voted for the executive," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).

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