The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers--An Incomplete Contracts Approach
The separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: the executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision maker. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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