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Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Mao

    (Microsoft Research)

  • Lili Dworkin

    (Socratic.org)

  • Siddharth Suri

    (Microsoft Research)

  • Duncan J. Watts

    (Microsoft Research)

Abstract

Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner’s Dilemma over the course of twenty consecutive weekdays. Consistent with previous work, the typical round of first defection moves earlier for several days; however, this unravelling process stabilizes after roughly one week. Analysing individual strategies, we find that approximately 40% of players behave as resilient cooperators who avoid unravelling even at significant cost to themselves. Finally, using a standard learning model we predict that a sufficiently large minority of resilient cooperators can permanently stabilize unravelling among a majority of rational players. These results shed hopeful light on the long-term dynamics of cooperation, and demonstrate the importance of long-run experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Mao & Lili Dworkin & Siddharth Suri & Duncan J. Watts, 2017. "Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 8(1), pages 1-10, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:8:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms13800
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms13800
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    Cited by:

    1. Wladislaw Mill & Jonathan Stäbler, 2023. "Spite in Litigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 10290, CESifo.
    2. Bonowski, Tim & Minnameier, Gerhard, 2022. "Morality and trust in impersonal relationships," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Salazar, Miguel & Joel Shaw, Daniel & Czekóová, Kristína & Staněk, Rostislav & Brázdil, Milan, 2022. "The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Wladislaw Mill & John Morgan, 2022. "The cost of a divided America: an experimental study into destructive behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 974-1001, June.
    5. Wladislaw Mill & Cornelius Schneider, 2023. "The Bright Side of Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 10615, CESifo.
    6. Leonard Hoeft & Michael Kurschilgen & Wladislaw Mill & Simone Vannuccini, 2022. "Norms as Obligations," Munich Papers in Political Economy 22, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    7. Minnameier, Gerhard & Bonowski, Tim Jonas, 2021. "Morality and Trust in Impersonal Relationships," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242438, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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