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Social evolution leads to persistent corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Joung-Hun Lee

    (Institute of Decision Science for a Sustainable Society, Kyushu University, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan; Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Nishiku, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan)

  • Yoh Iwasa

    (Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Nishiku, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan; Department of Bioscience, School of Science and Technology, Kwansei-Gakuin University, 669-1337 Sanda-Shi Hyogo, Japan)

  • Ulf Dieckmann

    (Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria; Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (Sokendai), Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193, Japan)

  • Karl Sigmund

    (Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria; Faculty for Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria)

Abstract

Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.

Suggested Citation

  • Joung-Hun Lee & Yoh Iwasa & Ulf Dieckmann & Karl Sigmund, 2019. "Social evolution leads to persistent corruption," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 116(27), pages 13276-13281, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:116:y:2019:p:13276-13281
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Xiaoyang & Chen, Tong & Chen, Qiao & Li, Xueya, 2020. "Increasing pool funds in public goods: The effects of deposit-based delayed rewards," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    2. Paolo Bova & Alessandro Di Stefano & The Anh Han, 2023. "Both eyes open: Vigilant Incentives help Regulatory Markets improve AI Safety," Papers 2303.03174, arXiv.org.
    3. Shi, Zhenyu & Wei, Wei & Zheng, Hongwei & Zheng, Zhiming, 2023. "Bidirectional supervision: An effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 450(C).
    4. Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2021. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics with payoff-dependent environmental feedback," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    5. Amaral, Marco A. & Oliveira, Marcelo M. de & Javarone, Marco A., 2021. "An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    6. Liu, Yuan & Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2022. "General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 165(P2).
    7. Salazar Restrepo, Verónica & Szentes, Balázs, 2024. "On the coevolution of cooperation and social institutions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119490, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Liu, Linjie & Chen, Xiaojie, 2022. "Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 425(C).

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