Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency as a Lender of Last Resort
This paper investigates borrowing from a lender of last resort at the individual bank level using data from a pre-Federal Reserve lender of last resort program, the Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency Act of 1908. Contrary to the reluctance to borrow hypothesis, banks with lower capital/asset ratios were more likely to borrow. Banks with a higher reserve ratio borrowed less.
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