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The Conflict Over Vertical Foreclosure In Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law

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  • Roger G. Noll

Abstract

Although competition law and intellectual property have overlapping economic rationales, they frequently conflict. One area of conflict is vertical leveraging. This paper analyzes recent legislation and court decisions dealing with vertical leveraging. The main conclusion is that two policy changes - granting patent rights to fundamental knowledge and extending the life of copyrights - increased the cost of permitting refusals to deal by rights holders, so that vertical leveraging of IP ought to be subject to a rule of reason test that weighs the benefits of innovation inducement against the costs of extended monopoly.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger G. Noll, 2004. "The Conflict Over Vertical Foreclosure In Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(1), pages 1-79, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200403)160:1_79:tcovfi_2.0.tx_2-d
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Burlamaqui, 2006. "How Should Competition Policies and Intellectual Property Issues Interact in a Globalised World? A Schumpeterian Perspective," The Other Canon Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 06, TUT Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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