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Strategic Manipulation of Property Rights in Coasean Bargaining

Author

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  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Christian Haslbeck

Abstract

In a model of Coasean bargaining over externalities it is described how agents can manipulate their opponent's reservation utility by strategic actions at a pre-bargaining stage, such as the choice of a pollution technology. This may imply misallocation of resources, and opening up trade possibilities will not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement. This problem is specific to bargaining over externalities and will never occur in the exchange of private goods. It is concluded that the government hat to supplement liability rules by additional restrictions on the agents' rights.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Christian Haslbeck, 1997. "Strategic Manipulation of Property Rights in Coasean Bargaining," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(4), pages 630-630, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199712)153:4_630:smopri_2.0.tx_2-h
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    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Habla & Ralph Winkler, 2017. "Strategic Delegation and International Permit Markets: Why Linking May Fail," CESifo Working Paper Series 6515, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements, Fiscal Federalism, and Constitutional Design," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 705-718, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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