The Dodd-Frank Act: Financial Reform or Business as Usual?
This paper revisits the premises and promises of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. It argues that it was based on flawed premises and for that reason failed to lay the foundation for substantive reform. By design, and at the behest of the banks, it lacks the explicit rules and bright lines that are critical to lasting and effective financial regulation. Also missing is a plausible end to "Too Big To Fail" financial institutions, over-leverage, and irresponsible (including fraudulent) risk-taking. The article closes with several concrete suggestions for strengthening regulatory agencies and improving financial regulation.
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