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The Timing of Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Some New Evidence

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  • Mixon, Franklin G, Jr
  • Gibson, M Troy

Abstract

This paper empirically tests two prevalent but competing theories regarding the timing of appointments to the Board of Governors by presidential administrations. Both theories were developed simultaneously in the economics literature by Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) and Waller (1992) and are observationally equivalent by suggesting that administrations will select partisans early in their four-year term and nonpartisans (sectoral) later in their four-year term, although each bases this prediction on a different theoretical model. Several empirical replications (with updated data sets) presented here work to confirm the solutions put forth consistently by both models. However, the results of a new statistical test perhaps lends slightly more credence to the theoretical foundations of Waller's bargaining model.

Suggested Citation

  • Mixon, Franklin G, Jr & Gibson, M Troy, 2002. "The Timing of Partisan and Nonpartisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Some New Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 361-375, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:34:y:2002:i:2:p:361-75
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    Cited by:

    1. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    3. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS

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