Demandable Debts as a Means of Payment: Banknotes versus Checks
We examine whether transactable forms of privately issued, demandable debt are better used as "banknotes" or "checks." The distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use whereas a banknote can circulate. We find that the answer to the question depends on the cost of early redemption. If this cost is small, banknotes will not circulate so the question is moot. If this cost is large, incentive problems may prevent the circulation of banknotes. For intermediate values of the early redemption cost, banknotes will be preferred over checks.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 31 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 1988.
"Explaining the demand for free bank notes,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr, pages 21-35.
- Rockoff, Hugh, 1974. "The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 141-67, May.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Flannery, Mark J, 1994.
"Debt Maturity and the Deadweight Cost of Leverage: Optimally Financing Banking Firms,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 320-31, March.
- Mark J. Flannery, 1991. "Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage: optimally financing banking firms," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
- Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, 02.
- Barbara A. Good, 1997. "Electronic money," Working Paper 9716, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Gorton, Gary, 1996. "Reputation Formation in Early Bank Note Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 346-97, April.
- Champ, Bruce & Wallace, Neil & Weber, Warren E., 1994.
"Interest rates under the U.S. national banking system,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 343-358, December.
- Bruce A. Champ & Neil Wallace & Warren E. Weber, 1993. "Interest rates under the U.S. national banking system," Staff Report 161, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Bruce Champ & Neil Wallace & Warren Weber, 1993. "Interest Rates Under the U.S. National Banking System," Economic History 9310001, EconWPA.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
- Rockoff, Hugh, 1985. "New Evidence on Free Banking in the United States [New Evidence on the Free Banking Era]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 886-89, September.
- Williamson, Stephen D., 1992. "Laissez-faire banking and circulating media of exchange," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 134-167, June.
- Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 99-129, 02.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:31:y:1999:i:3:p:500-525. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.