IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Concealment of Risk and Regulation of Bank Risk Taking

Listed author(s):
  • Kambhu, John
Registered author(s):

    This paper analyzes the effectiveness of banking regulation when risk can be concealed from the regulator. Three banking regimes are considered: regulation with direct controls, incentives-based regulation, and laissez-faire banking. The relative performance of the three regimes depends on the effectiveness of monitoring. Regulation with direct controls is superior when monitoring effectiveness is low, while incentives-based regulation is superior when monitoring effectiveness is high. Laissez-faire banking is equivalent to incentives-based regulation if market analysts and the regulator with direct controls can better restrain banks' risk taking than can the market; this result applies when banks can conceal much of their risk from the regulator. Copyright 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

    Volume (Year): 2 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 397-414

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:397-414
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:397-414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Rebekah McClure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.