IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v81y1994i3-4p297-321.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Organizational Slack in Subsidized Nonprofit Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Duizendstraal, Anton
  • Nentjes, Andries

Abstract

Informal objectives of managers next to the formal objective of the organization can be a source of organizational slack or X-inefficiency in nonprofit organizations. If the organization is subsidized, the donor can restrain organizational slack by choosing an appropriate subsidy system. Four subsidy systems are discussed: output, input, revenue, and lump-sum subsidy. Output subsidy reduces slack most. The ranking of input subsidy compared with lump-sum subsidy depends on the elasticity of demand for output. Revenue subsidy equals input subsidy. Changes in the subsidy regime for residential adult education in the Netherlands turn out to have been inconsistent. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Duizendstraal, Anton & Nentjes, Andries, 1994. "Organizational Slack in Subsidized Nonprofit Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 297-321, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:3-4:p:297-321
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maxwell, John W & Lyon, Thomas P & Hackett, Steven C, 2000. "Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 583-617, October.
    2. Ingberman Daniel E., 1995. "Siting Noxious Facilities: Are Markets Efficient?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 20-33, November.
    3. Ando, Amy Whritenour, 2001. "Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest-Group Behavior," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 312-332, May.
    4. Zagonari, Fabio, 1998. "International Pollution Problems: Unilateral Initiatives by Environmental Groups in One Country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 46-69, July.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 833-850.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
    7. Matthieu Glachant, 2003. "Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats," Working Papers 2003.36, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Heyes, Anthony G., 1997. "Environmental Regulation by Private Contest," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 407-428, February.
    9. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.
    10. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-494, July.
    11. Baik, Kyung H & Shogren, Jason F, 1992. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 359-362, March.
    12. Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Bises & Fabio Padovano, 2004. "Government Grants to Private Cultural Institutions–The Effects of a Change in the Italian Legislation," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 28(4), pages 303-315, November.
    2. Hielscher, Stefan & Pies, Ingo & Prinz, Aloys, 2015. "Umfassende Organisationsethik für die moderne Gesellschaft: Ein systematischer Vergleich gewinnorientierter und nicht-gewinnorientierter Unternehmen," Discussion Papers 2015-8, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    3. Roelof de Jong & Andries Nentjes & Doede Wiersma, 2000. "Inefficiencies in Public Environmental Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(1), pages 69-79, May.
    4. Bruno Bises, 2000. "Exemption or Taxation for Profits of Non-Profits? An Answer from a Model Incorporating Managerial Discretion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 19-39, July.
    5. Paul Raschky, 2007. "The overprotective parent - Bureaucratic agencies and natural hazard management," Working Papers 2007-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    6. Nolan Miller & Karen Eggleston & Richard Zeckhauser, 2006. "Provider choice of quality and surplus," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 103-117, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:81:y:1994:i:3-4:p:297-321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.