When Groups Contribute to a Public Good: The Importance of Institutional Framework for Making Collective Decisions
In this paper, the author discusses how the institutional framework for making collective decisions influences the outcome of a game where groups contribute to a public good. Representative democracy invites each group to act strategically in the election of representatives. The author shows that this strategic effect reinforces 'the tragedy of the common.' The society--all groups taken together--has, therefore, incentives to restrict groups from making collective decisions through a system of representation. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 80 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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