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Rent Dissipation through Self-Regulation: The Social Cost of Monopoly under Threat of Reform

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  • Leidy, Michael P

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  • Leidy, Michael P, 1994. "Rent Dissipation through Self-Regulation: The Social Cost of Monopoly under Threat of Reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 105-128, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:1-2:p:105-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
    2. Hodrick, Robert J & Prescott, Edward C, 1997. "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16, February.
    3. MacRae, C Duncan, 1977. "A Political Model of the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 239-263, April.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
    5. Burton Abrams & Plamen Iossifov, 2006. "Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 249-262, December.
    6. Faust, Jon & Irons, John S., 1999. "Money, politics and the post-war business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 61-89, February.
    7. Jon Faust & John S. Irons, 1996. "Money, politics and the post-war business cycle," International Finance Discussion Papers 572, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Haynes, Stephen E & Stone, Joe A, 1990. "Political Models of the Business Cycle Should Be Revived," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(3), pages 442-465, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2003. "The social cost of rent seeking when consumer opposition influences monopoly behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-69, March.
    2. Hoffmann, Magnus & Schmidt, Frederik, 2007. "Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach," MPRA Paper 3289, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction
      [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    4. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals
      [Lobby Wettkämpfe mit endogenen Politikvorschlägen]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2005-11, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    5. repec:elg:eechap:15325_4 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Magnus Söderberg & Makoto Tanaka, 2012. "Spatial price homogeneity as a mechanism to reduce the threat of regulatory intervention in locally monopolistic sectors," Working Papers hal-00659458, HAL.
    7. Münster, Johannes, 2005. "Lobbying contests with endogenous policy proposals," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 41, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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