Bicameralism and Majoritarian Equilibrium
Recent papers have established that bicameralism can support a nonempty core in majority voting games in two-dimensional policy spaces. The authors generalize this result to the n-dimensional case and provide a discussion of multicameralism. Bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria by institutionalizing opposition between mutually oriented median voters. This provides a clear link with the standard median voter model and with more traditional analyses of bicameralism. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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