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Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments


  • Borge, Lars-Erik
  • Sorensen, Rune J


To understand the role of political parties in public budget making, we need separate data about spending preferences and budgetary outcomes. In this paper we employ such data to discriminate between different models of how competing party preferences are transformed into policy outcomes. In the first step of the analysis data on politicians' spending preferences are used to estimate the desired allocation of each party. In the second step the desired allocations are used as inputs in a separate analysis of the decision-making process in Norwegian local councils. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Borge, Lars-Erik & Sorensen, Rune J, 2002. "Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 225-243, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:110:y:2002:i:3-4:p:225-43

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    2. Knight, Brian G., 2000. "Supermajority voting requirements for tax increases: evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 41-67, April.
    3. Matsusaka, John G, 2000. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the Twentieth Century," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 619-650, October.
    4. James M. Poterba, 1997. "Demographic structure and the political economy of public education," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 48-66.
    5. Joseph M. Johnson & W. Mark Crain, 2004. "Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Democratic Nations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 73-90, April.
    6. Lee, Kangoh, 2002. "An Analysis of Welfare Effects of Legislative Term Limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 245-260, March.
    7. Arsene Aka & W. Robert Reed & D. Eric Schansberg & Zhen Zhu, 1996. "Is There A "Culture Of Spending" In Congress?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 191-211, November.
    8. Lopez, Edward J, 2003. "Term Limits: Causes and Consequences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 1-56, January.
    9. Rogers, Diane Lim & Rogers, John H, 2000. "Political Competition and State Government Size: Do Tighter Elections Produce Looser Budgets?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 1-21, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Borge, Lars-Erik, 2005. "Strong politicians, small deficits: evidence from Norwegian local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 325-344, June.
    2. Jon Fiva & Gisle Natvik, 2013. "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 305-331, October.
    3. Jon H. Fiva & Olle Folke & Rune J. Sørensen, 2013. "The Power of Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 4119, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Parties Matter in Allocating Expenditures: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 652, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Lunder, Trond Erik, 2016. "Between centralized and decentralized welfare policy: Have national guidelines constrained the influence of local preferences?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-13.
    6. Jo Thori Lind, 2014. "Rainy Day Politics - An Instrumental Variables Approach to the Effect of Parties on Political Outcomes," CESifo Working Paper Series 4911, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Rune Sørensen, 2006. "Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 75-95, April.

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