Decision Making with Belief Functions: Compatibility and Incompatibility with the Sure-Thing Principle
This article studies situations in which information is ambiguous and only part of it can be probably. It is shown that the information can be modeled through belief functions if and only if the nonprobabilizable information is subject to the principle of complete ignorance. Next the representability of decisions by belief functions on outcomes is justified by means of a neutrality axiom. The natural weakening of Savage's sure-thing principle to unambiguous events is examined and its implications for decision making are identified. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 7 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11166/PS2|