The Effect of OSHA Records-Check Inspections on Reported Occupational Injuries in Manufacturing Establishments
In late 1981 Federal workplace safety officers, and those of several states, began on-site checks of plants' injury records to determine which establishments to inspect. Critics claim incentives for underreporting were thus created, and that published injury rates could be biased downward. Because the records-check procedure is not applied in all states or industries, this research (using four different statistical models) compares pre- to post-1981 changes in reported injury rates across states and industries. Data on 3059 uninspected plants suggests a 5-14 percent decline (cet. par.) in reported rates among plants potentially subject to the records-check procedure. Copyright 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 1 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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