An Economic Analysis of Lead Paint Laws
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework for determining whether laws designed to reduce lead paint risk are consistent with efficiency. We do this in the context of both owner-occupied and rental housing, and under different informational scenarios depending on who has knowledge about the risk. Our results suggest that efficient lead paint laws would impose on property owners and landlords a duty to notify buyers and tenants about known risks but would not impose on them a duty to inspect for or abate the risk. Our review of the existing law shows that common law standard are largely consistent with efficiency, but statutory law is not. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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