What influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation?: Evidence from Panel Data
This study examines what influences the changes in REIT CEO compensation using the following performance measures: average three-year total returns to shareholders, market value added, Tobin's q, and change in funds from operations. In addition, we examine the impact of managerial power on the change in compensation. Unbalanced panel data is employed to capture both the time-series and cross-sectional effects. The empirical evidence indicates that firm performance and size do not influence the change in CEO salary, while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Contrary to previous findings and a priori expectations, bonuses are not influenced by risk, size, or CEO power; however, they are influenced by performance. Option awards are affected by performance and CEO power.
Volume (Year): 33 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Diane Quarles American Real Estate Society Manager of Member Services Clemson University Box 341323 Clemson, SC 29634-1323|
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