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A position assignment experiment among active duty United States Navy physicians

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Childers

    (University of California, San Diego, USA)

  • Alicea Mingo

    (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, United States Navy, USA)

  • Joel Schofer

    (US Navy Medicine Readiness and Training Command Guam, Captain, Medical Corps, United States Navy)

  • Naomi Utgoff

    (United States Naval Academy, USA)

  • William Howard Beasley

    (University of Oklahoma Health Campus, USA)

Abstract

The United States Navy (USN) assigns personnel to jobs via assignments officers; placement guidance exists but the process is decentralized. Participant attitudes towards and limited experience with market design are possible impediments to its incorporation into the assignment process. We investigate the appetite for the use of the deferred acceptance during the assignment process. We implemented a pilot project incorporating deferred acceptance into 231 assignments of 174 USN physicians to 23 commands. Pre-intervention, we surveyed physicians to obtain baseline perceptions of the traditional assignment process; post-intervention we surveyed pilot project participants. Only 38.2% of pre-pilot survey respondents said they preferred assignment via deferred acceptance; in the post-pilot survey 78.7% of participating physicians and 87.8% of participating commands reported a desire to keep using deferred acceptance. Our study suggests that attitudes towards using market design in personnel assignment may improve with experience, facilitating broader acceptance of its usage in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Childers & Alicea Mingo & Joel Schofer & Naomi Utgoff & William Howard Beasley, 2025. "A position assignment experiment among active duty United States Navy physicians," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 10(1), pages 123-162, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v10i1a5
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan M.V. Davis & Kyle Greenberg & Damon Jones, 2023. "An Experimental Evaluation of Deferred Acceptance: Evidence from Over 100 Army Officer Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 31612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-427, March.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013. "Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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