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Group Reputation Supports Beneficent Norms

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates the role of group normative reputation in the promotion of an aggression reducing possession norm in an artificial society. A previous model of normative reputation is extended such that agents are given the cognitive capacity to categorise other agents as members of a group. In the previous model reputational information was communicated between agents concerning individuals. In the model presented here reputations are projected onto whole groups of agents (a form of "stereotyping"). By stereotyping, norm followers outperform cheaters (who do not follow the norm) under certain conditions. Stereotyping, by increasing the domain of applicability of a piece of reputational information, allows agents to make informed decisions concerning interactions with agents which no other agent has previously met. However, if conditions are not conducive, stereotyping can completely negate norm following behaviour. Group reputation can be a powerful mechanism, therefore, for the promotion of beneficent norms under the right conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • David Hales, 2002. "Group Reputation Supports Beneficent Norms," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5(4), pages 1-4.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2002-21-2
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    Cited by:

    1. Elsenbroich, Corinna & Payette, Nicolas, 2020. "Choosing to cooperate: Modelling public goods games with team reasoning," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    2. Flaminio Squazzoni, 2010. "The impact of agent-based models in the social sciences after 15 years of incursions," History of Economic Ideas, Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma, vol. 18(2), pages 197-234.
    3. Andrew W. Bausch, 2014. "Evolving intergroup cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 369-393, December.
    4. Martin Neumann, 2008. "Homo Socionicus: a Case Study of Simulation Models of Norms," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(4), pages 1-6.
    5. Christian Hahn & Bettina Fley & Michael Florian & Daniela Spresny & Klaus Fischer, 2007. "Social Reputation: a Mechanism for Flexible Self-Regulation of Multiagent Systems," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(1), pages 1-2.
    6. Corinna Elsenbroich & Jennifer Badham, 2016. "The Extortion Relationship: A Computational Analysis," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 19(4), pages 1-8.
    7. Marco Catola & Silvia Leoni, 2023. "Pollution Abatement and Lobbying in a Cournot Game. An Agent-Based Modelling approach," Discussion Papers 2023/294, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    8. Corinna Elsenbroich & Maria Xenitidou, 2012. "Three kinds of normative behaviour: minimal requirements for feedback models," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 113-127, March.

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