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Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralisation

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  • Mario Jametti
  • Marcelin Joanis

Abstract

Fiscal decentralization is high on the agenda in policy fora. This paper empirically investigates the underlying causes of Â…fiscal decentralization, based on the predictions of a simple political economy model. We argue that the likeliness that a central government engages in devolution of powers depends in important ways on the political forces that it faces, the theoryÂ’'s main insight being that the central governmentÂ’'s electoral strength should, all else being equal, decrease that governmentÂ’'s share of spending. Consistent with the model'Â’s predictions, empirical results from a panel of democracies support the relevance of political factors as determinants of fiÂ…scal decentralization. The relationship between central government electoral strength and both expenditure and revenue centralization emerges as negative and non-linear.
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  • Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2016. "Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralisation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 37, pages 285-300, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ifs:fistud:v:37:y:2016:i::p:285-300
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    Cited by:

    1. Koomin Kim, 2023. "How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 53-81, July.
    2. Aleksandra Maksimovska & Aleksandar Stojkov, 2019. "Composite Indicator of Social Responsiveness of Local Governments: An Empirical Mapping of the Networked Community Governance Paradigm," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 144(2), pages 669-706, July.
    3. Borge, Lars-Erik & Brueckner, Jan K. & Rattsø, Jorn, 2014. "Partial fiscal decentralization and demand responsiveness of the local public sector: Theory and evidence from Norway," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 153-163.
    4. Kodjovi M. Eklou & Marcelin Joanis, 2019. "Do Fiscal Rules Cause Fiscal Discipline Over the Electoral Cycle?," IMF Working Papers 2019/291, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Mario Jametti & Marcelin Joanis, 2020. "Elections and de facto expenditure decentralization in Canada," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 275-297, September.
    6. Alexeev, Michael & Mamedov, Arseny, 2017. "Factors determining intra-regional fiscal decentralization in Russia and the US," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 425-444.
    7. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
    8. Lars-Erik Borge & Jan K. Brueckner & Jorn Rattso, 2012. "Partial Fiscal Decentralization and Public-Sector Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Norway," CESifo Working Paper Series 3954, CESifo.
    9. Yannis Psycharis & Maria Zoi & Stavroula Iliopoulou, 2016. "Decentralization and local government fiscal autonomy: evidence from the Greek municipalities," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 34(2), pages 262-280, March.
    10. Pedro Jorge Holanda Figueiredo Alves & Jevuks Matheus Araujo & Ana Karolina Acris Melo, 2023. "Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: evidence from Brazilian states," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 47(2), pages 255-280.
    11. Sergio Galletta, 2020. "Direct democracy, partial decentralization and voter information: evidence from Swiss municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(5), pages 1174-1197, October.
    12. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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