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Collusive Equilibrium In Cournot Oligopolies With Unknown Costs

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  • Subir K. Chakrabarti

Abstract

The article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs. I look at collusive pooled Perfect Bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication. In the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards. In the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards. Among these, the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted joint profits.

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  • Subir K. Chakrabarti, 2010. "Collusive Equilibrium In Cournot Oligopolies With Unknown Costs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1209-1238, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:51:y:2010:i:4:p:1209-1238
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00616.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    2. Joao Correia-da-Silva, 2013. "Impossibility of market division with two-sided private information about production costs," FEP Working Papers 490, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    3. Hadjikhani, Amjad & Hadjikhani, Annoch Isa & Thilenius, Peter, 2014. "The internationalization process model: A proposed view of firms’ regular incremental and irregular non-incremental behaviour," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 155-168.

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