Surplus Sharing with a Two-State Mechanism
In this article we consider environments where agents jointly produce a private output good by contributing privately owned resources. An efficient Outcome may not be realized due to strategic behavior and conflicting interests of the agents. We construct a two-stage mechanism, building on a Varian mechanism. The modified mechanism ensures an equilibrium for a large class of preferences and guarantees the feasibility of outcomes. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 41 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ierEmail:
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:41:y:2000:i:2:p:399-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.