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Precautionary Savings under Liquidity Constraints: A Decomposition


  • Xu, Xiaonian


This paper investigates the effects of liquidity constraints on consumption/saving by separating precautionary saving caused by liquidity constraints (PS2) from the conventional precautionary saving made against income uncertainty (PS1). It is proved that there exists a unique level of wealth below which PS2 is strictly positive and above which liquidity constraints have no effects at all. The numerical simulations show that PS2 is quantitatively important, depending on age and the level of wealth. Some empirical findings in the literature cannot be explained by PS1 alone but are consistent with the model in which PS2 is present. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Xiaonian, 1995. "Precautionary Savings under Liquidity Constraints: A Decomposition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 675-690, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:3:p:675-90

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eaton, Jonathan & Fernandez, Raquel, 1995. "Sovereign debt," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 3, pages 2031-2077 Elsevier.
    2. Cole, Harold L & Dow, James & English, William B, 1995. "Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 365-385, May.
    3. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters,in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 39-106 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Fernandez, R. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1988. "Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations: A Strtegic Analysis," Papers 85, Boston University - Center for Latin American Development Studies.
    5. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 43-50, March.
    6. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-1089, July.
    7. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    8. Kahn, J.A., 1989. "Credible Borrowing Constraints With Renegotiable Debt," RCER Working Papers 175, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    9. Garber, Peter M., 1991. "Alexander Hamilton's market-based debt reduction plan," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 79-104, January.
    10. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
    11. Herschel I. Grossman, 1987. "Lending to an Insecure Sovereign," NBER Working Papers 2443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1991. "Reputation with multiple relationships: reviving reputation models of debt," Staff Report 137, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    13. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
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    Cited by:

    1. Clemens, Christiane, 1999. "Income Taxation, Government Expenditure, and Long-Run Stochastic Growth," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-220, Leibniz Universit├Ąt Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult├Ąt.
    2. Kurmas Akdogan, 2010. "Foreign Exchange Reserves in a Credit Constrained Economy," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1014, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    3. Scott, Andrew, 2000. "Optimal consumption when capital markets are imperfect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 65-70, January.
    4. Angelos A. Antzoulatos, 1996. "Capital flows & current account deficits in the 1990s: why did Latin America & East Asian countries respond differently?," Research Paper 9610, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Jeong-Joon Lee & Yasuyuki Sawada, 2005. "Precautionary Saving under Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Rural Pakistan (Published in "Journal of Development Economics". )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-051, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    6. repec:pit:wpaper:230 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Lee, Jeong-Joon & Sawada, Yasuyuki, 2010. "Precautionary saving under liquidity constraints: Evidence from rural Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 77-86, January.
    8. Feigenbaum, James, 2011. "Precautionary saving or denied dissaving," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1559-1572, July.
    9. Anagnostopoulos Alexis & Tang Xin, 2015. "Evaluating linear approximations in a two-country model with occasionally binding borrowing constraints," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 1-49, January.
    10. Osborne, Theresa, 2006. "Credit and risk in rural developing economies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 541-568, April.

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