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Heterogeneity and the Incentive to Share Information in Cournot Oligopoly Market

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  • Hwang, Hae-shin

Abstract

This paper addresses the robustness of information-sharing incentives of the Cournot oligopoly firms to differences in the cost functions and the quality of information. Specifically, the author investigates which firm has more incentive to share information; the conditions under which information sharing is mutually beneficial; and when it is not mutually beneficial, the conditions under which a firm gains enough to entice the unwilling firm into sharing information by compensation. He shows that the firm with a less convex cost function has more incentives to share information and presents conditions for the latter two issues. Copyright 1994 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Hwang, Hae-shin, 1994. "Heterogeneity and the Incentive to Share Information in Cournot Oligopoly Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 329-345, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:35:y:1994:i:2:p:329-45
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    Cited by:

    1. Jos Jansen & Andreas Pollak, 2014. "Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment," Economics Working Papers 2014-20, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    2. Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri, 2015. "Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 701-732, August.
    3. Mustafa Caglayan & Murat Usman, 2004. "Incompletely informed policymakers and trade policy in oligopolistic industries," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 72(3), pages 283-297, June.
    4. Jos Jansen & Andreas Pollak, 2015. "Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Qiu, Larry D. & Zhou, Wen, 2006. "International mergers: Incentives and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 38-58, January.
    6. Jos Jansen & Andreas Pollak, 2014. "Strategic Disclosure of Demand Information by Duopolists: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 75, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.

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