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How Paulus Becomes Saulus An Experimental Study of Equal Punishment Games

Author

Listed:
  • Marlies Ahlert

    (Martin-Luther-University of Halle-Wittenberg, Department of Economics, Institute for Financial Science, Halle/Saale, Germany)

  • Arwed Cr³ger

    (Martin-Luther-University of Halle-Wittenberg, Department of Economics, Institute for Financial Science, Halle/Saale, Germany)

  • Werner G³th

    (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Unit, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

In equal punishment games like in ultimatum games first a proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in ultimatum games, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above by the sum of the offer and the (for proposer and responder) same show up-fee, our only treatment variable. Although inequality aversion predicts zero-punishments, we observe positive punishments which however, decrease with experience, Initial fairness, 1/3 of initial offers were equal splits, is often substituted in the repetition by greed. Whereas greed is sticky, fairness seems to be an initial inclination but unstable.

Suggested Citation

  • Marlies Ahlert & Arwed Cr³ger & Werner G³th, 2001. "How Paulus Becomes Saulus An Experimental Study of Equal Punishment Games," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 18, pages 303-318.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:303-318
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    Cited by:

    1. James Andreoni & Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie, 2009. "Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 25, pages 35-63.
    2. James Andreoni & Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie, 2003. "What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 672-685, June.
    3. Andreoni,J. & Castillo,M. & Petrie,R., 2000. "What do bargainers' preferences look like? : exploring a convex ultimatum game," Working papers 25, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. Cox, James C. & Friedman, Daniel & Gjerstad, Steven, 2007. "A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 17-45, April.

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