IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jgames/v1y2010i2p137-158d8784.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?

Author

Listed:
  • Christine Grüning

    (Department of Business Administration and Economics, European University Viadrina, PO Box 1786, D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany)

  • Wolfgang Peters

    () (Department of Business Administration and Economics, European University Viadrina, PO Box 1786, D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany)

Abstract

The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine Grüning & Wolfgang Peters, 2010. "Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(2), pages 1-22, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:137-158:d:8784
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/2/137/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/2/137/
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
    2. Jon Hovi & Hugh Ward & Frank Grundig, 2015. "Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 665-688, December.
    3. Lin, Yu-Hsuan, 2018. "How Social Preferences Influence the Stability of a Climate Coalition," MPRA Paper 85428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Lin, Yu-Hsuan, 2018. "How does Altruism Enlarge a Climate Coalition?," MPRA Paper 86484, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    International Environmental Agreements; coalition formation; justice and fairness;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:2:p:137-158:d:8784. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team). General contact details of provider: http://www.mdpi.com/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.