IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fma/fmanag/carter91.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence From Converting Savings and Loan Associations

Author

Listed:
  • Richard B. Carter
  • Roger D. Stover

Abstract

We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Morck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard B. Carter & Roger D. Stover, 1991. "Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence From Converting Savings and Loan Associations," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(4), Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:carter91
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gaston, Noel, 1997. "Efficiency wages, managerial discretion, and the fear of bankruptcy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 41-59, May.
    2. Toyne, Michael F. & Millar, James A. & Dixon, Bruce L., 2000. "The relation between CEO control and the risk of CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 291-306, September.
    3. Salem Lotfi Boumediene, 2014. "Detection And Prediction Of Managerial Fraud In The Financial Statements Of Tunisian Banks," Accounting & Taxation, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 6(2), pages 1-10.
    4. Shkendije Himaj, 2014. "Corporate Governance in Banks and its Impact on Risk and Performance: Review of Literature on the Selected Governance Mechanisms," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 3(3), pages 53-85.
    5. Catherine M. Schrand & Haluk Unal, 1995. "Hedging and Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Borochin, Paul & Knopf, John D., 2021. "Do managers seek control and entrenchment?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:carter91. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Courtney Connors (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fmaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.