IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fec/journl/v13y2018i1p32-51.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

Author

Listed:
  • Ngo Van Long

    (Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7, Canada)

  • Maxwell Tuuli

    (Peter B. Gustavson School of Business, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8P 5C2, Canada)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North- South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngo Van Long & Maxwell Tuuli, 2018. "Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power," Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, Higher Education Press, vol. 13(1), pages 32-51, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:fec:journl:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:32-51
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-007-018-0004-4
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    incomplete contracts; bargaining power; offshoring; reshoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fec:journl:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:32-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Frank H. Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.