Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members
In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative. Under appropriate conditions on the penalty strategy of the cooperative, the faithfulness of all members will provide a Nash equilibrium for the considered game, which at the same time also is an attractive solution, with the cooperative as a distinguished player.
Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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