IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members

Listed author(s):
  • Cesarino Bertini


    (University of Bergamo, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, Bergamo, Italy)

  • Gianfranco Gambarelli


    (University of Bergamo, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, Bergamo, Italy)

  • Antonino Scarelli


    (University of Tuscia, Department of Ecology and Sustainable Economic Development, Viterbo, Italy)

  • Zoltán Varga


    (Szent István University, Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Gödöllö, Hungary)

Registered author(s):

    In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the members of a marketing cooperative may take advantage of an external market price, higher than that offered by the cooperative. Under appropriate conditions on the penalty strategy of the cooperative, the faithfulness of all members will provide a Nash equilibrium for the considered game, which at the same time also is an attractive solution, with the cooperative as a distinguished player.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 162-171

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_162
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Opletalova 26, CZ-110 00 Prague

    Phone: +420 2 222112330
    Fax: +420 2 22112304
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Web: Email:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Stastna)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.