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El efecto de los conflictos de agencia en las políticas de dividendos a los accionistas. El caso chileno


  • Lefort, Fernando

    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)


In this paper explores whether payout ratios of Chilean companies are explained by the extent of potential agency conflicts between controlling and minority share- holders. I use both panel data regression analysis and an event study to test different hypotheses related to the effect of corporate governance on payout policies. The results show that in the context of an emerging economy, such as Chile, that presents high ownership concentration and extensive use of conglomerates and pyramid structures, the rent-seeking theory of the effect of agency problems payout policy seems to be especially relevant. Companies that present a higher degree of coincidence between cash flow rights and control rights tend to have more generous dividend policies. On the other hand, unexpectedly high dividend announcements made by companies with potentially higher agency conflicts present higher abnormal returns.// En este articulo investigo los coeficientes (ratios) de pago de dividendos de las compañías chilenas pueden explicarse por el grado de los conflictos potenciales de agencia entre los accionistas minoritarios y los que controlan la empresa. Utilizo el análisis de regresión de un panel de datos y un estudio de hechos para someter a prueba diferentes hipótesis relacionadas con el afecto de la gestión empresarial en las políticas de pago a los accionistas.Los resultados muestran que en el contexto de una economía emergente, como la chilena, que presenta una alta concentración de la propiedad y una extendida utilización de conglomerados y estructuras piramidales, la teoría de la búsqueda de la renta para explicar los efectos de los problemas de agencia en las políticas de pago de dividendos parecen ser en particular pertinentes. Las compañías que presentan un grado mas alto de coincidencia entre los derechos de flujo de efectivo y los derechos de control tienden a tener políticas de dividendos mas generosas. Por otra parte, los anuncios de dividendos inesperadamente altos que hacen compañías con un potencial mayor de conflictos de agencia presentan rendimientos anormalmente altos.

Suggested Citation

  • Lefort, Fernando, 2008. "El efecto de los conflictos de agencia en las políticas de dividendos a los accionistas. El caso chileno," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(299), pages 597-639, julio-sep.
  • Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:75:y:2008:i:299:p:597-639

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    Cited by:

    1. Urzúa I., Francisco, 2009. "Too few dividends? Groups' tunneling through chair and board compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 245-256, April.
    2. Christian Espinosa & Carlos Maquieira, 2010. "Productivity: Sensibilidad del Flujo de Caja sobre la Inversión en Sudamérica: Evidencia para Chile," Working Papers 15, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.

    More about this item


    Agency conflicts; Dividends; Corporate Governance; Conglomerates; conflictos de agencia; dividendos; gestión empresarial; conglomerados; Chile;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)


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