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Intermediación y confianza


  • Christopher Kingston

    (Amherst College)


It is well known that among a community of traders in which particular pairs of traders only transact occasionally, and have opportunities to cheat, cooperation be sustained if information about traders’ reputations can circulate within the group. In many applications, however, the potential for developing reputations is limited. This paper studies how intermediaries («brokers») can help to sustain cooperation by removing the need for traders to have information about each other. Rather than trusting other traders, each of whom they interact with only occasionally, traders place their trust in the broker, with whom they each interact frequently. To illustrate, we explore the role of intermediaries in bribe transactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Kingston, 2011. "Intermediación y confianza," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 77(02), pages 64-85.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:2011205

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Mendonca, Sandro & Cunha, Miguel Pina e & Kaivo-oja, Jari & Ruff, Frank, 2003. "Wild cards, weak signals and prganizational improvisation," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp432, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
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    More about this item


    intermediation; trust; cooperation; broker;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy


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