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Friends or foes? The insurgent’s dilemma of seeking legitimacy while keeping secrets

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  • Escalante, Enrique

Abstract

Why do some rebel groups seek legitimacy more than others? This article develops a theory to explain that the variation among insurgencies will depend on a trade-off insurgents confront between the interest to obtain legitimacy and the exposure to vulnerability. Inclusive insurgencies disclose information to seek legitimacy, allowing rebels to gain popular support, secure resources, and broader collaboration with non-combatants, thereby enhancing operational efficiency. In contrast, exclusive insurgencies, often emerging from radical factions, emphasize secrecy to protect the insurgency from existential threats, as their leaders are more easily targeted, leaks are relatively costlier, and disclosure increases the risk of detection. Faced with this trade-off and constrained by the likelihood of splintering, insurgencies unleash violent and non-violent actions. The theory is supported by an analysis of Peru’s 1980–2000 insurgencies: the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement.

Suggested Citation

  • Escalante, Enrique, 2026. "Friends or foes? The insurgent’s dilemma of seeking legitimacy while keeping secrets," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:199:y:2026:i:c:s0305750x25003444
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2025.107258
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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