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The persistent impact of electoral incentives on the quality of infrastructure

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  • Rogger, Daniel
  • Somani, Ravi

Abstract

What determines the quality of a nation’s infrastructure? We show that electoral incentives at the time of construction have persistent effects on the functionality of contemporary African water systems. We apply a common event-study approach to the universe of water points in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania built over the period from 1970–2014. Across all three settings, we find that infrastructure installed in the run-up to an election is significantly more likely to be functioning today than those installed shortly after elections. Our results suggest that politicians respond to electoral incentives by adjusting the provider of installed water systems. Together, the findings suggest that public officials optimally respond to responsive but myopic citizen evaluations of public performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Rogger, Daniel & Somani, Ravi, 2023. "The persistent impact of electoral incentives on the quality of infrastructure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000622
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104880
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