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Minority game with peer pressure

Author

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  • Chau, H.F
  • Chow, F.K
  • Ho, K.H

Abstract

To study the interplay between global market choice and local peer pressure, we construct a minority-game-like econophysical model. In this so-called networked minority game model, every selfish player uses both the historical minority choice of the population and the historical choice of one's neighbors in an unbiased manner to make decision. Results of numerical simulation show that the level of cooperation in the networked minority game differs remarkably from the original minority game as well as the prediction of the crowd–anticrowd theory. We argue that the deviation from the crowd–anticrowd theory is due to the negligence of the effect of a four point correlation function in the effective Hamiltonian of the system.

Suggested Citation

  • Chau, H.F & Chow, F.K & Ho, K.H, 2004. "Minority game with peer pressure," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 332(C), pages 483-495.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:332:y:2004:i:c:p:483-495
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2003.10.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2017. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 59-93, April.

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