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CEO Party School education and ESG performance: Evidence from China

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  • He, Xudong
  • Yu, Shuang
  • Zheng, Zunxin

Abstract

While the impact of general political connections on corporate behavior is well-documented, the role of formal, ideological training, such as that provided by Party Schools remains unexplored. This study examines the influence of CEOs with Party School education on the ESG performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2010 to 2023. Our findings suggest that Party School education has a significant positive impact on corporate ESG performance. This effect operates through multiple mechanisms: alignment with government objectives, enhanced responsiveness to local economic development pressure, incentives for political promotion, and improved access to government subsidies. The results contribute to a broader understanding of politically connected leadership in transition economies and offers policy implications for optimizing the selection and training mechanisms of SOE leaders in Asia-Pacific areas.

Suggested Citation

  • He, Xudong & Yu, Shuang & Zheng, Zunxin, 2026. "CEO Party School education and ESG performance: Evidence from China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:96:y:2026:i:c:s0927538x25003713
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2025.103034
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    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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