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Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market

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  • Juarez, Noelia
  • Manasero, Paola B.
  • Oviedo, Jorge

Abstract

We study the strategic implementation of stable matchings in many-to-one matching markets where firms have path-independent choice functions. First, we prove that any stable mechanism implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash equilibrium. Second, we show that the Immediate Acceptance mechanism implements the stable correspondence in truthful-firm Nash equilibrium. Finally, we establish that the Deferred Acceptance mechanism implements the stable correspondence when only workers behave strategically and firms report their true preferences. However, this result does not hold when only firms behave strategically.

Suggested Citation

  • Juarez, Noelia & Manasero, Paola B. & Oviedo, Jorge, 2026. "Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:141:y:2026:i:c:s0165489626000247
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102517
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