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Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements


  • Kolasinski, Adam
  • Li, Xu


We find that insiders trade as if they exploit market underreaction to earnings news, buying (selling) after good (bad) earnings announcements when the price reaction to the announcement is low (high). We also find that insider trades attributable to public information about earnings and the price reaction generate abnormal returns. By demonstrating that managers spot market underreaction to earnings news, our results imply that managers are savvy about their company's stock price.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolasinski, Adam & Li, Xu, 2010. "Are corporate managers savvy about their stock price? Evidence from insider trading after earnings announcements," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 27-44, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jappol:v:29:y::i:1:p:27-44

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    Cited by:

    1. Lont, David & Griffin, Paul & McClune, Kate, 2011. "Insightful Insiders? Insider Trading and Stock Return Around Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures," Working Paper Series 4088, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Gider, Jasmin & Westheide, Christian, 2016. "Relative idiosyncratic volatility and the timing of corporate insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 312-334.
    3. Paul A. Griffin & David H. Lont & Kate McClune, 2014. "Insightful Insiders? Insider Trading and Stock Return around Debt Covenant Violation Disclosures," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 50(2), pages 117-145, June.


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