Equilibrium incentives for most-favored customer clauses in an oligopolistic industry
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- Pinar Akman & Morten Hviid, 2005. "A Most-Favoured-Customer Guarantee with a Twist," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2005-08, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Gilo, David & Spiegel, Yossi, 2018. "The antitrust prohibition of excessive pricing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 503-541.
- Stephan, Levy, 2004. "Best-price Guarantees as a Quality Signal," MPRA Paper 13466, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Nov 2004.
- Klibanoff Peter & Kundu Tapas, 2010. "Monopoly Pricing under a Medicaid-Style Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Its Welfare Implication," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-43, August.
- Walter Beckert & Paolo Siciliani, 2018.
"Protecting Vulnerable Consumers in "Switching Markets","
Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance
1808, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Walter Beckert & Paolo Siciliani, 2018. "Protecting vulnerable consumers in "switching markets"," IFS Working Papers W18/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Patrick Hughes & Margaret Sanderson, 1998. "Conspiracy Law and Jurisprudence in Canada: Towards an Economic Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 153-176, April.
- Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2003.
"Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic Accommodation,"
Economic Research Papers
269490, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Dobson, Paul W & Waterson, Michael, 2003. "Chain-Store Pricing For Strategic Accommodation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 677, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- David Besanko & Shana Cui, 2019. "Regulated versus negotiated access pricing in vertically separated railway systems," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 1-32, February.
- Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Siciliani, Paolo & Beckert, Walter, 2017. "Spatial models of heterogeneous switching costs," Bank of England working papers 689, Bank of England.
- Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, 2016. "The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 105-134.
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