IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v157y2026icp263-285.html

Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

Author

Listed:
  • Athanasoglou, Stergios
  • Bonkoungou, Somouaoga

Abstract

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, M-winning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Athanasoglou, Stergios & Bonkoungou, Somouaoga, 2026. "Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 263-285.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:157:y:2026:i:c:p:263-285
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825626000229
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009. "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
    2. Laurent Bartholdi & Wade Hann‐Caruthers & Maya Josyula & Omer Tamuz & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Equitable Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 563-589, March.
    3. Abhinaba Lahiri & Anup Pramanik, 2020. "On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 581-607, April.
    4. Taylor, Alan D. & Zwicker, William S., 1996. "Quasi-weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 331-346, October.
    5. Houy, Nicolas & Zwicker, William S., 2014. "The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 7-16.
    6. Achille Basile & Surekha Rao & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, 2022. "Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 807-826, April.
    7. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1977. "Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 72-91, June.
    8. Larsson, Bo & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 272-287, December.
    9. Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S., 2021. "The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    10. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Optimal Voting Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 688-717.
    11. Achille Basile & Anna De Simone & Ciro Tarantino, 2022. "A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-19, November.
    12. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    13. Kivinen, Steven, 2023. "On the manipulability of equitable voting rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 286-302.
    14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7683 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S., 2022. "Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 138-149.
    16. Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S., 2022. "Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 85-91.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou, 2024. "Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice," Papers 2402.13009, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
    2. Hagiwara, Makoto & Ochiai, Goro & Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2026. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    3. Anna De Simone & Ciro Tarantino, 2021. "Functional Form of Nonmanipulable Social Choice Functions with Two Alternatives," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(21), pages 1-14, November.
    4. Achille Basile & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao & Anna De Simone & Ciro Tarantino, 2024. "Isotone Classes of Social Choice Functions with Binary Range," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-18, December.
    5. Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S., 2022. "Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 138-149.
    6. Achille Basile & Anna De Simone & Ciro Tarantino, 2022. "A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-19, November.
    7. Achille Basile & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao & Surekha Rao, 2025. "The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 64(3), pages 529-555, May.
    8. Anna De Simone & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, 2024. "Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-9, December.
    9. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    10. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele & Meo, Claudia, 2025. "Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    11. Sergio Rajsbaum & Armajac Raventós-Pujol, 2026. "A combinatorial topology approach to Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 66(2), pages 357-394, March.
    12. Achille Basile & Surekha Rao & K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, 2020. "The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference," Papers 2002.06341, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2020.
    13. Steven Kivinen, 2024. "Weak Equity," Graz Economics Papers 2024-04, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    14. Deniz Kattwinkel & Alexander Winter, 2024. "Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty," Papers 2407.07293, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    15. Basile, Achille & Rao, Surekha & Bhaskara Rao, K.P.S., 2022. "Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 85-91.
    16. Kivinen, Steven, 2024. "Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    17. Liu, Shuo, 2019. "Voting with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
    18. Jonne Lehtimäki & Marianne Palmu, 2022. "Who Should You Listen to in a Crisis? Differences in Communication of Central Bank Policymakers," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(3), pages 33-57.
    19. James McNeil, 2024. "Modeling interest rate setting at the European Central Bank with bargaining models and counterfactuals," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 1037-1053, March.
    20. Souvik Roy & Soumyarup Sadhukhan, 2019. "A characterization of random min–max domains and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(4), pages 887-906, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:157:y:2026:i:c:p:263-285. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.