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Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice

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  • Athanasoglou, Stergios
  • Bonkoungou, Somouaoga

Abstract

We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, M-winning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compared to their M-winning counterparts. The analysis extends to the full preference domain. Since M-winning coalition rules are closely related to strong and proper simple games, the analysis is relevant to this strand of the game-theoretic literature as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Athanasoglou, Stergios & Bonkoungou, Somouaoga, 2026. "Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 263-285.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:157:y:2026:i:c:p:263-285
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.002
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