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Curbing energy consumption through voluntary quotas: Experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Campigotto, Nicola
  • Catola, Marco
  • D’Alessandro, Simone
  • Guarnieri, Pietro
  • Spadoni, Lorenzo

Abstract

This paper explores the potential of voluntary consumption quotas as a strategy to address resource supply shortages. The results of an incentivized online experiment are presented in which a Nash demand game was used to model an energy consumption problem. Participants had the option to join an energy conservation program by accepting a consumption quota. Those who accepted the quota traded off their maximum demand for energy in exchange for the certainty that their demand would be met, while those who rejected the quota could demand and possibly earn more but risked suffering from a power outage, in which case they received nothing. Three different quota schemes are examined, and their policy implications are discussed. Our findings suggest that voluntary quotas may lead to a significant decrease in overall demand and contribute to enhancing consumption security.

Suggested Citation

  • Campigotto, Nicola & Catola, Marco & D’Alessandro, Simone & Guarnieri, Pietro & Spadoni, Lorenzo, 2025. "Curbing energy consumption through voluntary quotas: Experimental evidence," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:150:y:2025:i:c:s014098832500708x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108881
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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