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Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks

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  • Park, Junghum
  • Ju, Biung-Ghi

Abstract

We investigate TU-game solutions that are neutral to collusive agreements among players. A collusive agreement binds collusion members to act as a single player and is feasible when they are connected on a network. Collusion neutrality requires that no feasible collusive agreement can change the total payoff of collusion members. We show that on the domain of network games, there is a solution satisfying collusion neutrality, efficiency and null-player property if and only if the network is a tree. Considering a tree network, we show that affine combinations of hierarchical outcomes (Demange, 2004; van den Brink, 2012) are the only solutions satisfying the three axioms together with linearity. As corollaries, we establish characterizations of the average tree solution (equally weighted average of hierarchical outcomes); one established earlier in the literature and the others new.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Junghum & Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2016. "Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 254(1), pages 179-187.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:254:y:2016:i:1:p:179-187
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.011
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    Cited by:

    1. László Á. Kóczy, 2022. "Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1001-1027, November.
    2. Hui He & Lilong Zhu, 2020. "Online shopping green product quality supervision strategy with consumer feedback and collusion behavior," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-19, March.

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