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Compensated successful efforts for avoided deforestation vs compensated reductions

Author

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  • Tacconi, Luca

Abstract

In recent years, several proposals for the design of a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) within the United Nations Convention on Climate Change have been advanced. The essence of these proposals is to provide financial benefits to developing countries proportionally to the amount of avoided emissions they achieve, i.e. output based. A paper published in Ecological Economics [Combes Motel, P., Pirard, R., Combes, J.L. 2008. A methodology to estimate impacts of domestic policies on deforestation: Compensated Successful Efforts for "avoided deforestation" (REDD). Ecological Economics doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.06.001.] aims to provide an alternative termed Compensated Successful Efforts (CSE). It suggests that financial benefits should be provided on the basis of developing countries' successful 'efforts' to reduce emissions from deforestation, i.e. input based. The CSE approach also differs from previous ones in relation to the definition of what should be counted as avoided deforestation and how to estimate avoided deforestation. The present paper discusses the CSE approach and points out several shortcomings.

Suggested Citation

  • Tacconi, Luca, 2009. "Compensated successful efforts for avoided deforestation vs compensated reductions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2469-2472, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:68:y:2009:i:8-9:p:2469-2472
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Doupe, 2014. "The Costs of Error in Setting Reference Rates for Reduced Deforestation," CCEP Working Papers 1415, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    3. Pirard, R. & Combes, J.-L. & Combes Motel, P., 2009. "A response to the commentary on "Compensated Successful Efforts"," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2179-2181, June.
    4. Doupe, Patrick, 2014. "The costs of error in setting reference rates for reduced deforestation," Working Papers 249497, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
    5. Rachmat Mulia & Atiek Widayati & Suyanto & Putra Agung & Muhammad Zulkarnain, 2014. "Low carbon emission development strategies for Jambi, Indonesia: simulation and trade-off analysis using the FALLOW model," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 19(6), pages 773-788, August.
    6. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 12-31, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
    7. Mohammed, Essam, 2011. "Pro-poor benefit distribution in REDD+: Who gets what and why does it matter?," MPRA Paper 43648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00747405 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, 2017. "Trade and Environmental Quality in African Countries: Do Institutions Matter?," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(1), pages 155-172, January.
    10. Figuieres, Charles & Leplay, Solenn & Midler, Estelle & Thoyer, Sophie, 2012. "The REDD Scheme to Curb Deforestation: A Well-designed System of Incentives?," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 239-257, September.

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