From Heteronomy To Autonomy: The Development Of Moral Thinking In Children In Genetic Epistemology

This article examines the development of moral thinking in children through the lens of genetic epistemology, as formulated by Jean Piaget. It argues that moral judgment is not innate or merely socially transmitted, but progressively constructed through the interaction between cognitive development and social experience. The analysis focuses on key domains such as moral realism, responsibility, lying, and justice, showing a gradual shift from heteronomous morality—characterized by obedience to external rules and evaluation based on consequences—to autonomous morality, where intentions, reciprocity, and cooperation become central. The discussion integrates Piaget’s empirical findings with philosophical perspectives, particularly in relation to the problem of lying and the development of justice. Comparisons with Immanuel Kant highlight the contrast between externally imposed rules and self-legislated moral principles, while connections with Aristotle and John Rawls situate Piaget’s work within broader ethical traditions. The article also contrasts Piaget’s approach with the stage theory of Lawrence Kohlberg, emphasizing the former’s focus on social interaction and practical activity rather than abstract reasoning alone. The central claim is that moral autonomy emerges from cooperative social relations, where norms such as truth and justice acquire meaning through shared practices. Thus, Piaget’s theory provides not only a psychological account of moral development but also a valuable framework for philosophical reflection on the foundations of normativity.