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Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent

Author

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  • Ausubel, Lawrence M
  • Deneckere, Raymond J

Abstract

This paper analyzes a class of alternating-offer bargaining games with one-sided incomplete information for the case of "no gap." If sequential equilibria are required to satisfy the additional restrictions of stationarity, monotonicity, pure strategies, and no free screening, the authors establish the silence theorem: when the time interval between successive periods is made sufficiently short, the informed party never makes any serious offers in the play of alternating-offer bargaining games. A class of parametric examples suggests that the time interval required to assure silence is not especially brief. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Ausubel, Lawrence M & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1992. "Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 597-625, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:3:p:597-625
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    Cited by:

    1. William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 219-243, November.
    2. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr & Prokop, Jacek, 1993. "The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 851-882.
    3. Mohr, Ernst, 1995. "Sustainable development and international distribution: Theory and application to rainforests as carbon sinks," Discussion Papers, Series II 257, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. repec:the:publsh:2543 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Prokop, Jacek, 2003. "Conditional versus unconditional bidding in takeovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 123-149, June.
    7. Xavier Jarque & Clara Ponsat?Author-Name: Jozsef Sakovics, 2001. "Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 502.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    8. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
    9. Mohr, Ernst, 1993. "Sustainable development and international distribution: Theory and application to rainforests as carbon sinks," Kiel Working Papers 602, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    10. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2013. "Bargaining over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 312, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    11. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    12. Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 803-830, September.

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